Papers in Organizations -Editor's Foreword
The purpose of the series Papers in Organization is to work as a stepping-stone towards final publication in scientific journals. As such, PIO is a working-paper series, yet with a distinct position in the process towards final publication. The aim of PIO is to be the final steppingstone in that process:
-For the author PIO should add value to the work in progress through the editorial process. A publication in PIO is thus also a measure of the quality of the work -it is no longer simply a draft or an informal contribution to debates, but a work close to final publication.
-For the reader PIO should be a good place to be if one wants to keep track of contemporary research within the international field of organization studies. Indeed, many of the papers are manuscripts, which have been submitted to social science journals and as such appear in a rather final stage of completion. Others may contribute with empirical results from ongoing research projects or may in a more theoretical sense contribute to current academic disputes.
In this paper, Mie Augier and David Teece outline the history and development of the ideas underlying an emerging approach within strategic management research: the dynamic capabilities framework. The framework was first outlined by Teece and Pisano (1994) , and in the present paper elaborated further so the reader will be able to appreciate some of the most important intellectual resources underpinning it, such as the work of Schumpeter, Penrose, Williamson, Cyert and March, Rummelt, Nelson and Winter. Although listed as intellectual resources by the authors, they also turn (some of) them into a topic for further discussion. For example, Augier and Teece identify not only the merits but also the limitations of transaction costs economics. In this way, the authors pave the way for a more dynamic framework while drawing upon organization theory and scholars like Cyert and March (a behavioral theory of the firm) and Nelson and Winter (an evolutionary theory of economic change). In the dynamic capability framework firms and markets co-evolve. Managers are now allowed to perform distinct strategic roles in shaping both firms and their markets, e.g. through asset-selection and orchestration, including also the task of allocating resources between exploitation and exploration.
Introduction
There is wide agreement that Joseph accepted (Teece, 1982 (Teece, , 1986 Rumelt, 1984; Dosi, Nelson and Winter, 2000; Winter, 2000 Winter, , 2003 Pisano, 1994, Teece et al 1997; Teece, 2003) . 2 Although the idea and terminology of organizations as bundles of competencies dates back to Oskar Morgenstern (1951) , the more well known originator of the term was Philip Selznick (1957) . Selznick introduced the idea of a firm's 'distinctive competence'; and Prahalad and Hamel (1990) popularized the idea of the 'core competencies' of the organization. For a discussion of some of these developments, see Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000) .
3 Richardson (1972) relied on Edith Penrose's (1959) idea of the firm as a collection of resources yielding various productive services. As Richardson (1972, p. 888) noted: "It is convenient to think of industry as carrying out an indefinitely large number of activities, activities related to the discovery and estimation of future wants, to research, developThere are both static and dynamic versions of the competences and capabilities tradition. Whereas the lineage of static versions of the capabilities framework can be traced to Ricardo, the lineage of dynamic versions can be attributed to Schumpeter (Teece et al, 1997 (Teece et al, , 2003 . Scholars in strategic management, organizational theory, organizational economics, sociology, and innovation studies have embraced the dynamic version of capabilities with considerable enthusiasm.
This paper sketches the history of the development of the ideas underlying modern approaches to competencies and (dynamic)
capabilities. 4 In addition to providing a coherent framework for studying strategic management under conditions of uncertainty, rapid technological change and ambiguity, the dynamic capabilities framework is also well suited to the analysis of learning, thereby facilitating the integration of economic, organizational, and strategic ment, and design, to the execution and co-ordination of processes of physical transformation, the marketing of goods, and so on. And we have to recognize that these activities have to be carried out by organizations with appropriate capabilities, or, in other words, with appropriate knowledge, experience, and skills".
issues (Levinthal and March, 1993; Winter and Zollo, 2002) .
Antecedents and brief history

Introduction
The field of strategic management has in recent years leveraged off of theories of economic organization in general and theories of the firm in particular. This was not always so. When Rumelt (1984) identified "a strategic theory of the firm" and pronounced that the study of business strategy must take off from economic theories of the firm, the linkages between economic theories of the firm and strategic management were either weak or non-existent. Tensions existed and in many respects still remain, between the neoclassical theory of the firm and strategic management. This is because of the cavalier treatment in economics of know-how, the static focus of neoclassical theory, and the strong behavioral assumptions around (hyper)rationality embedded in neoclassical theory (Winter and Teece, 1984; Teece, 1984; Simon, 1993) .
Over the past 50 years, some progress had been made in the social sciences to help craft more realistic foundations for the theory of the firm. For instance, the ideas of ance is a function of engrained repertoires (Dosi, 1988; Teece, 1984; March, 1994 rents, but such quasi rents will be competed away, often rather quickly. It cannot earn Schumpeterian rents because it hasn't built the capacity to be continually innovative.
Nor is it likely to be able to earn monopoly (Porterian) rents since these require exclusive behavior or strategic manipulation (Teece, 2003 The conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or half-manufactured goods, again irrespective of whether this source already exists or whether it has first to be created. (5) The carrying out of the new organization of any industry, like the creation of a monopoly position (for examplethrough trustification) or the breaking up of a monopoly position. (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 66 (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1985 9 The way in which governance (choice of firm boundary) issues do come into play in strategic management is well illustrated in Teece (1986) , where there is extensive discussion of complementary assets and whether or not these should be internalized. Deciding whether to "own" or "rent" (i.e. integrate or outsource) complementary assets depends on whether the assets were available in competitive supply. A concern to focus on is the distribution of gains (and losses) between the innovator and the owners of the complementary assets. Williamson also explores appropriability through ex 8 The link between transaction cost economics and strategy was present already when Williamson (1975) demonstrated the relevance of transaction cost ideas to issues of corporate strategy (such as efficient firm boundaries); and the ChandlerWilliamson M-form hypothesis quickly became a key insight in the strategic management field, in particular after being supported by a number of empirical studies, beginning with Armour and Teece (1978) .
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Williamson clearly recognizes that even in the world of transaction cost economics, governance costs are not the only costs that are relevant to the firm. "Production costs"
are mentioned, but not analyzed deeply.
However, much lies within "production costs" that economists and management scholars need to understand. They include not just operational issues, but strategic issues too. Some production related issues are operational --such as the establishment of flexible procurement, enabling the firm to take advantage of changing competitive pricing -and some highly strategic, such as whether or not to invest in a new plant, whether to advance a new generation of products now, later, or never. Clearly, the performance of a business is going to be very significantly impacted by production and investment choices, as well as by governance choices.
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In short, the (dynamic) capabilities framework suggests that the scope of the firm cannot be explained just by transaction cost considerations. Rather, asset selection (internalization) decisions must also make reference to complementarities and cospecialization for reasons of scope economies, and appropriability (Teece, 2003) . 1098). Indeed, the very first empirical study to show the predictive power of asset specificity in setting firm boundaries (Monteverde and Teece, 1982) also showed that weight diesel technology at the G.M. Labs. The earliest use was in submarines. Alfred P. Sloan, GM's Chairman, saw the possibility of applying the technology to make diesel electric locomotives. (Steam power was, at the time, completely dominant). G.M. needed capabilities resident in the locomotive manufacturers, and at Westinghouse Electric. As Langlois notes: "The three sets of capabilities might have been combined by some kind of contract or joint venture. But the steam manufacturers -Alco, Baldwin, and Lima -failed to cooperate. This was not, however, because they feared hold-up in the face of highly specific assets. Rather, it was because they actively denied the desirability of the diesel and fought its introduction at every step. General Motors was forced to create its own capabilities in locomotive manufacturer (p. 115)." poste recontracting. However, the appropriability issues of most concern to business managers do not come from a pure form of what Williamson calls "the fundamental transformation". With this transformation, an exante large numbers bargaining situation is transformed into a small numbers situation after idiosyncratic irreversible investment assets are deployed, and recontracting hazards result. Rather, it is simply that technological innovation changes the demand for certain inputs (resources) and their complements. The entity that can cleverly bargain to obtain a "long" position in those assets on favorable terms will be able to appropriate a greater share of the gains from innovation. Put differently, in Teece (1986) , it is asset selection based on value creation that shapes firm boundary selection issuesnot just the minimization of transaction costs. 11 For other relevant and informative -although perhaps a bit more skeptical -discussions of the complementarity between transaction cost theory and capability ideas, see Dosi and Marengo, 2000; Dosi, 2004. even greater predictive power was associated with cospecialization or "systems integration" causing Teece (1990) cisions in a firm (Cyert and March, 1963) . Thus, it is the dynamic nature of aspirations which enables the generation of new decision alternatives. Therefore, the firm must engage in active search and imagination to create sustainable strategic opportunities (Winter, 2000) .
Relationship to the Behavioral Theory of the Firm
The behavioral theory of the firm is a more dynamic perspective than transaction cost theory. It wasn't intended as a theory of strategy; but several insights from the behavioral perspective are used in both the resource based view (Barney, 1991) and dynamic capability theory (Teece et al, 2002) .
The behavioral theory is built around a political conception of organizational goals, a bounded rationality conception of expectations, an adaptive conception of rules and aspirations, and a set of ideas about how the interactions among these factors affect deIn the behavioral view, agents have only limited rationality, meaning that behavior in organizations is intendedly rational; neither emotive nor aimless (March and Simon, 1958 . Since firms are seen as heterogene- 
Relationship to Evolutionary ideas of the firm (and strategy)
The evolutionary theory of the firm goes back to (at least) Alfred Marshall's con- 13 Within this framework, four concepts were developed. The first is the quasi-resolution of conflict, the idea that firms function with considerable latent conflict of interests but do not necessarily resolve that conflict explicitly. The second is uncertainty avoidance. Although firms try to anticipate an unpredictable future insofar as they can, they also try to restructure their worlds in order to minimize their dependence on anticipation of the highly uncertain future. The third concept is problemistic search, the idea that search within a firm is stimulated primarily by problems and directed to solving those problems. The fourth concept is organizational learning. The theory assumes that firms learn from their own experiences and the experiences of others. Alchian (1950 Alchian ( , 1953 and Edith Penrose (1952 Penrose ( , 1953 . The debate (concerning, among other things, the role of intentionality in economic selection and the use of a population of heterogeneous firms as a basis for selection) led to the formal evolutionary work by Winter (1964 Winter ( , 1971 Winter ( , 1975 .
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14 As Marshall explains in his 'Principles': "we may read a lesson from the young trees in the forest as they struggle upwards through the benumbing shade of their older rivals. Many succumb on the way, and a few only survive; those few become stronger with every year, they get a larger share of light and air with every increase of their height, and at last in their turn they tower above their neighbors. One tree will last longer in full vigor and attain a greater size than another; but sooner or later age tells on them all. And as with the growth of trees, so was it with the growth of business as a general rule before the great recent development of vast joint-stock companies, which often stagnate, but do not readily die" (Marshall, 1925, p. 315-316) . For excellent discussions of Marshall's evolutionary ideas, see the work of Brian Loasby (1976 Loasby ( , 1989 and a notion of the firm as endogenously creating its productive opportunity set.
This line of thought was provided by Edith
Penrose (1959) . Penrose (1959) was the first to argue that the firm is a repository of capabilities and knowledge and that learning is central to firm growth and to provide a theory of firms that explicitly makes room for issues relating to the production and exploitation of productive knowledge. Productive knowledge is often related to other organizational (material) assets.
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The firm, she said, is "both an administrative organization and a collection of productive resources, both human and material" (p. 320). The services rendered by these resources are the primary inputs into a firm's
The firm in their view is seen as a profit seeking entity whose primary activities are to build (through organizational learning processes) and exploit valuable knowledge assets. Firms in this view also come with 'routines' or 'competencies', which are recurrent patterns of action which may change through search and learning. Routines will seldom be 'optimal' and will differ among agents and behaviors cannot be deduced from simply observing the environmental signals (such as prices) that agents are exposed to. This variety drives the evolutionary process since firms articulate rent-seeking strategies on the basis of their routines and competencies and compe-17 As Penrose writes: "For physical resources the range of services inherent in any given resource depends on the physical characteristics of the resource, and it is probably safe to assume that at any given time the known productive services inherent in a resource do not exhaust the full potential of the resource... The possibilities of using services change with changes in knowledge.. there is a close connection between the type of knowledge possessed by the personnel in the firm and the services obtainable from its material resources" (1959, p. 76 
The Evolving Dynamics of Organizational Capabilities
Because firms face strategic decisions on the basis of past history, it is natural to view questions relating to the development of strategy and competences in an evolutionary setting (Simon, 1993; Winter, 2000) . The most recent chapter in the history of competencies and capabilities is the dynamic capabilities approach, which seeks to provide a coherent (and evolutionary) framework, which can both integrate existing conceptual and empirical knowledge and facilitate prescription. First outlined in Teece and Pisano (1994) and elaborated in Teece et al (1997) , a paper which had circulated for seven years as a working paper, 19 the dynamic capabilities approach builds upon the theoretical foundations provided by Schumpeter (1934) , Penrose (1959) , Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , Cyert and March (1963) , Rumelt (1984) , Nelson and Winter (1982) , Teece (1982) and Teece et al (1994) . In particular, it is consistent with the Schumpeterian view that the emergence of new products and processes results from new combinations of knowledge. In a similar vein, it is argued in the dynamic capabilities approach that competitive success arises from the continuous development and reconfiguration of firm-specific assets (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al, 1997) . Whereas Penrose and the resourcebased scholars recognize the competitive importance of firm-specific capabilities, researchers of the dynamic capabilities approach attempt to outline specifically how organizations develop and renew internal competencies. Thus, the latter approach is concerned with a subset of a firm's overall capabilities, namely, those that allow firms 18 Teece's paper on the multiproduct firm (Teece, 1982) was the first to apply Penrose's ideas to strategic management issues. He focused on her observation that human capital in firms is usually not entirely 'specialized' and can therefore be (re)deployed to allow the firm's diversification into new products and services. He also used Penrose's view that firms possess excess resources which can be used for diversification. Later, Wernerfelt (1984) cites Penrose for "the idea of looking at firms as a broader set of resources … [and] the optimal growth of the firm involves a balance between exploitation of existing resources and development of new ones" . 19 This explains why references to dynamic capabilities began before the publication of this paper. In the early to mid 90's, the working paper versions were quoted. See for instance Mahoney and Pandian (1992 One key difference is that the firm achieves coordination and adaptation with respect to non-traded or thinly traded assets; the market on the other hand enables rapid adaptation with respect to assets which are actively traded in thick markets (Teece, 2003) .
The dynamic capability perspective follows Hayek (1945) is the need for economic agents to engage in trading activities, and for managers/entrepreneurs to "integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments" (Teece et al., 1997) . Coordinating and adapting effectively to changing environments (Cyert and March 1963) is an element of a firm's dynamic capabilities. Barnard (1938) and Richardson (1960) were early to develop these themes. The use of the term "market failure" is only relative to the theoretical norm of absolute static and dynamic efficiency. Of course, a (private) enterprise economic system as a whole achieves an efficient allocation of resources, as strategic managers and the organization they lead are an inherent part of the economic system. However, the framework does highlight the fact that management systems and corporate governance must function well for a private enterprise market oriented system to function well.
respond to the observations made (March and Simon, 1958) . If this path is chosen, then rules may become codified and routinely applied (Casson 2000, p.129) whenever certain changes are detected. 22 However, such rules need to be periodically revised for the firm to have dynamic capabilities.
firms (Chandler, 1990; Teece, 1993; Simon, 1991) . Put simply, firms and markets coevolve. Hence, while the need for asset coordination and orchestration and associated investment choices may be the fundamental problem which the firm's dynamic capabilities help address, the firm's dynamic capabilities -particularly its ability to introduce new products and services into the market -not only shapes markets; it also requires firm-level responses by competitors, suppliers, and sometimes customers.
In some circumstances, new information and new situations may be best dealt with by forming a new firm (Knight, 1921) .
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Those who discover the new information, and can figure out the appropriate response, need not be the same individual(s) who start a new enterprise; but given the absence of a well functioning market for information about new market opportunities, the discoverer and the enterprise founder may need to be one and the same.
The coordinating and resource allocating capabilities featured in dynamic capabilities shape markets, as much as markets shape
The emergence/development of markets is thus important for strategic management.
Elsewhere (Teece,1998) 24 22 Casson argues that rule making is entrepreneurial, but that rule implementation is routine, and is characterized by managerial and administrative work.
Research Agenda Implications
'Competencies' and 'capabilities' are seductive concepts. They are significant parts 23 Frank Knight was (probably) the first to argue a distinct entrepreneurial theory of the firm (Langlois and Cosgel 1993) . In particular, Knight thought of entrepreneurs as possessing different judgments (and different capacities for judgments) and acting upon (and profiting from) genuine uncertainty and unpredictability: "[I]t is true uncertainty which by preventing the theoretically perfect outworking of the tendencies of competition gives the characteristic form of 'enterprise' to economic organization as a whole and accounts for the peculiar income of the entrepreneur" (Knight 1921, p. 232) . 24 The creation of intermediate markets is not readily explained by asset specificity concerns, as implied by transaction cost economics. The absence of standards, or simply the decisions by incumbent firms to size production so as to avoid the need to sell intermediate products are possible explanations for the enigma of markets for intermediate inputs.
of many modern theories of organization and strategic management; yet there's considerable confusion about the precise nature of the concepts (Dosi, Nelson and Winter, 2000) . Recent contributions have clarified the key ideas somewhat (Winter, 2003; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, 2003) .
The full implications for a research agenda are still to be explored; however, we can outline at least the following important implications for research theory of the firm and strategic management; and for issues relating to entrepreneurship/leadership. In its simplest form -the theoretical firm must choose among alternative values for a small number of well-defined variables; price, output, perhaps advertising outlay. In making this choice management is taken to consider the costs and revenues associated with each candidate set of values, as described by the relevant functional relationships, equations, and inequalities. Explicitly or implicitly the firm is then taken to perform a mathematical calculation which yields optimal (i.e., profit maximizing) values for all of its decision variables and it is these values which the theory assumes to be chosen -which are taken to constitute the business decision. There matters rest, forever or until exogenous forces lead to an autonomous change in the environment. Until there is such a shift in one of the relationships that define the problem, the firm is taken to replicate precisely its previous decisions, day after day, year after year.
Strategic Management and the
of no clever ruses, ingenious schemes, brilliant innovations, of no charisma or of any of the other stuff of which outstanding entrepreneurship is made; one does not hear of them because there is no way in which they can fit into the model" (Baumol, 1968, p. 67) .
ences asset selection and asset orchestration as a part of dynamic capabilities.
In an economic system, principals and/or their agents must design and implement processes to manage change, must direct the reinvestment of cash flow, and must configure asset portfolios, including allocating resources between exploitation and exploration (March, 1991 (March, , 1994 . They must also stand ready to reconfigure them as circumstances change. In a strict evolutionary views of the world, there is no specific agent and no hierarchy responsible for regulating the evolutionary process (Cohendet, Llerena and Marengo 2000) . Winter and Teece (1984) The manager/entrepreneur must articulate goals, set culture, build trust, and play a critical role in the key strategic decisions.
Clearly the role of the entrepreneur and the 18 manager overlap to a considerable extent.
As Simon (1991) (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002) . The astute performance of this function will help achieve what Porter (1996) calls "strategic fit", not just with internally controlled assets, but with the assets of alliance partners. 26 The manager/entrepreneur can also shape learning processes with the firm. These are not functions which can be achieved by markets divorced from managers/entrepreneurs.
Thus the entrepreneur/manager function in the dynamic capabilities framework is in part Schumpeterian (the entrepreneur introduces novelty and seeks new combinations) and in part evolutionary (the entrepreneur endeavors to promote and shape learning).
Whether intrapreneur or entrepreneur, the function senses new opportunities and leads the organization forward to seize them.
The entrepreneur/ manager must therefore lead. These are roles not recognized by economic theory; but these roles are the essence of dynamic capabilities and are critical to the theory of strategic management.
Conclusion
Several decades with evolutionary theory has brought shifting focus on several fronts.
Not only has areas such as economics, (Schumpeter, 1947, p. 9) .
The future relevance of competences and capabilities within strategic management will depend on whether future developments in the field will bring us closer to an empirically relevant paradigm, which can accommodate and address issues relating to the dynamics of the business enterprise.
This in turn will depend on the ability of the scholars and ideas within strategic management to work together and for the research program to accommodate an interdisciplinary vision, and to be disciplined (March, 1996) . Such a (interdisciplinary, yet disciplined) vision is the first step toward realizing a coherent program in stra- 
